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FROM: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
THE SECRET "KILL LIST"
AND THE PRESIDENT
Kenneth AndersontM y corner of the national security law world is abuzz today
reading the outstanding New York Times article by Jo
Becker and Scott Shane, "Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test
of Obama's Principles and Will."' As Ben Wittes says at Lawfare,2 it
is a richly textured, detailed look at how the administration ap-
proaches targeted killing (whether with drones or human teams or
in combination), and is the most detailed insider account of how the
administration has gradually evolved a process for vetting targets.
Opinio Juris' Deborah Pearlstein focuses in on a key passage' in the
story, one that talks about the essentially casuistical evolution of
targeting standards, case by case:
It is the strangest of bureaucratic rituals: Every week or so,
more than 100 members of the government's sprawling nation-
al security apparatus gather, by secure video teleconference, to
pore over terrorist suspects' biographies and recommend to the
president who should be the next to die.
This secret "nominations" process is an invention of the
Obama administration, a grim debating society that vets the
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PowerPoint slides bearing the names, aliases and life stories of
suspected members of Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen or its allies
in Somalia's Shabab militia. The video conferences are run by
the Pentagon, which oversees strikes in those countries, and
participants do not hesitate to call out a challenge, pressing for
the evidence behind accusations of ties to Al Qaeda.
"What's a Qaeda facilitator?" asked one participant, illus-
trating the spirit of the exchanges. "If I open a gate and you
drive through it, am I a facilitator?" Given the contentious dis-
cussions, it can take five or six sessions for a name to be ap-
proved, and names go off the list if a suspect no longer appears
to pose an imminent threat, the official said. A parallel, more
cloistered selection process at the C.I.A. focuses largely on Pa-
kistan, where that agency conducts strikes. The nominations
go to the White House, where by his own insistence and guid-
ed by Mr. Brennan, Mr. Obama must approve any name. He
signs off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia and also on the
more complex and risky strikes in Pakistan - about a third of
the total.
The article is important in several ways. First, it seems pretty
clear that the administration cooperated in giving information to the
reporters, because it wants to make clear that there is a process and
a robust one for making targeting decisions. In this regard, this arti-
cle fits with the series of national security speeches by senior offi-
cials and general counsels of national security departments of gov-
ernment - most of them are collected here, at Lawfare, in a list 4
that gets periodically updated. It is quite true that if one believes
that targeted killing is simply extrajudicial execution as a matter of
substance, or that it has to be approved by a judge, or that the pro-
cess has to be judicial rather than that of the political branches or the
executive acting in an armed conflict and/or national self defense,
then none of this will impress you. But if you are most people in the
United States, your reaction is much more likely to be, good, I'm
glad they are killing the bad guys, and I'm glad they're thinking hard
about who they're killing and why before they do it. Clearly the
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/readings-the-national-security-law-speeches-of-the-ob
ama-administration -general-counsels/.
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administration wants to get across a message to the public that there
is a serious process, even if the circumstances for making targeting
decisions are novel.
That signal is aimed, presumably, at broad opinion-setting elites
- liberal and conservative, but mostly liberal - whose visceral reac-
tions to how the issue is framed (targeting in unconventional war or
just remote execution?) matter over the long run to its institutional
legitimacy. As Jack Goldsmith has pointed out in his new book,
Power and Constraint, targeted killing and drone warfare are likely
to be the next "detention and interrogation" ground of de-
legitimation in the broader argument over counterterrorism. The
Obama administration is more aware than most administrations just
how important it is to hold a certain legitimacy high ground, and
that starts with its framing among opinion-elites.
Second, there is also likely a signal here to the judicial branch
that this is not unconsidered or purely discretionary; far from it.
More exactly, there is a signal that the judiciary would have no abil-
ity to do a better job, as an effectiveness question, quite apart from
the Constitutional and other domestic legal questions. It is highly
unlikely that the judicial branch, taken as a whole, has any appetite
for getting involved in these questions - particularly on the front
end, of signing off in advance on targeting, effectively death war-
rants, given the Constitutional and other domestic legal issues
raised. Even in an indirect, informal way, this kind of article helps
set the picture of a process with serious mechanisms for discussion
and review; it helps establish the legitimacy of the process - and so
also helps establish the legitimacy of the judiciary staying out of it.
Third, the administration wants to send a clear signal that the
President considers and signs off on these personally, and that this is
far from a perfunctory or unconsidered sign-off. I applaud the Pres-
ident for this level of personal review; I think it is right. This signal
carries a certain ambiguity, however - one that I believe the admin-
istration needs to consider closely. The ambiguity lies in whether
the President's personal, considered attention to each decision is
understood and conveyed to the public as a matter of the burden of
the institutional presidency - something that would be no less true
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of a President Romney than a President Obama. In that case the im-
plication is that President Obama is stepping up to the plate to es-
tablish a process not just for himself, but for his successors and for
the institution of the presidency. And he does so in a way that both
sets a precedent (in the sense of a certain burden) for the proper
level of involvement of the president in targeted killing decisions.
But, while setting a presidential burden, this also gives future presi-
dents important institutional legitimacy, through the weight of
precedent established by the acts of a prior president, and institu-
tional stability - to targeted killing, specifically, but also by implica-
tion to the emerging paradigm of covert and small-scale self-defense
actions against non-state terrorist actors which, in the future, may
or may not have anything to do with Al Qaeda and might be ad-
dressed to wholly new threats.
The alternative is that President Obama is sending a signal that
these actions are legitimate only because he is personally trusted to
do the right thing on these decisions, just because he is Barack
Obama. His constituencies trust him with this power in a way that
they would not entrust to any other president, including those who
come after. In other words, there is a question implicit in the New
York Times description as to whether the President is conferring a
purely personal legitimacy that disappears with this presidency, or
whether he and his administration are creating a long term process,
and conferring the weight of institutional legitimacy on it.
It is obvious from how I've framed the ambiguity that I believe
that the administration has an obligation to create lasting institution-
al structures, processes, institutional settlement around these poli-
cies. It owes it to future presidencies; every current president is a
fiduciary for later presidents. It also owes it to the ordinary officials
and officers, civilian and military, who are deeply involved in carry-
ing out killing and death under the administration's claims of law -
it needs to do everything it can to ensure that things these people do
in reliance on claims of lawfulness will be treated as such into the
future. And in fact I believe this is what the senior leaders and law-
yers who have issued speeches for the administration are seeking.
But I think there is still room for the players involved to say clearly
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that these processes are legitimate for the executive, this president
and future presidents.
Finally, we might add, the article says that the decision to target
Anwar Al-Aulaqi was, in the President's mind, an "easy one." //
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